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BREACH-THE DELAWARE COURT OF
CHANCERY EMPLOYED A GROSS
NEGLIGENCE STANDARD IN A CASE OF
DIRECTOR INACTION AND HELD THAT
THE DIRECTORS OF THE WALT DISNEY
COMPANY DID NOT BREACH THEIR
FIDUCIARY DUTY OF DUE CARE
Leslie Mattingly*
FTER the high-profile hiring and firing of Michael Ovitz by The
Walt Disney Company ("Disney"), the corporation's sharehold-
ers brought a derivative suit against the company's board of di-
rectors in the case of In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation.1
The shareholders alleged that the board members had "consciously and
intentionally disregarded their responsibilities" with respect to their deci-
sions to hire and fire Ovitz; thereby, breaching their fiduciary duties to
the corporation.2 The Chancery Court of Delaware disagreed and held in
favor of the defendants. 3 In the context of director inaction, the court
should employ an ordinary negligence standard, because directors who
ignore their responsibilities should not benefit from the presumption of
the business judgment rule. Further, even with the protection of the busi-
ness judgment rule, the facts of the case do not support the court's con-
clusion that Disney Chairman and CEO, Michael Eisner, availed himself
of all reasonable information available in making his decisions to hire and
fire Ovitz, because the process he employed in making that decision com-
pletely denied involvement to the rest of the board of directors.
The saga began with the sudden death of Disney's president, when the
company was faced with finding a replacement. 4 Eisner took complete
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1. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Lit'g, No. Civ. A. 15452, 2005 WL 2056651,
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control of the process and actively pursued his friend of almost twenty-
five years, Ovitz. 5 Ovitz was a co-founder of Creative Artist Agency
(CAA), a preeminent talent agency.6 Eisner enlisted Irwin Russell, the
chairman of Disney's compensation committee, to negotiate the financial
terms of the deal.7 Relying on nothing more than the approximated rep-
resentations of Ovitz's attorney, Russell assumed that Ovitz was earning
roughly $20 to $25 million a year at CAA.8 After developing a proposed
employment agreement, Russell prepared a study of the agreement for
Eisner which reported that Ovitz's salary would be much greater than the
Disney CEO's and that the number of stock options provided for in the
agreement far exceeded not only Disney standards, but those of corpo-
rate America.9 Financial analysis revealed that Ovitz's proposed employ-
ment agreement was worth somewhere between $23 and $24 million per
year once Ortiz's salary and stock options were taken into considera-
tion. 10 The agreement also contained a non-fault termination provision
which would be triggered if Disney fired Ovitz for any reason other than
gross negligence, malfeasance, or if Ovitz walked away for a reason not
permitted by the agreement."1 During these negotiations, Eisner called a
board meeting, before which only three board members knew about the
negotiations with Ovitz or the terms of the employment agreement.1 2
Eisner informed Disney's general counsel and chief financial officer
that Ovitz had accepted the offer, and both men were unhappy with the
decision. 13 The next day, however, Ovitz and Eisner signed the agree-
ment, which outlined Ovitz's employment terms.1 4 The agreement was
subject to the compensation committee's and board of director's ap-
proval; however, Eisner never provided a copy of the analysis or the ac-
tual terms of the agreement to the committee.' 5 When the committee
met, they discussed the terms of Ovitz's agreement for merely an hour,
and never examined an actual draft of the agreement. 16 Afterward, the
full board unanimously elected Ovitz Disney's president. 17 It was appar-
ent early on, however, that Ovitz was failing to integrate into the corpo-
rate culture at Disney and had little, if any, success with the projects to
which he was assigned.' 8 The plaintiffs alleged grounds for a fault-based
termination existed, because Ovitz was a habitual liar and he failed to
5. Id.
6. Id. at *34.
7. Id. at "5.
8. Id.
9. Id. at *6.
10. Id. at *7.
11. Id. at *6.
12. Id. at*7.
13. Id. at *8.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at *9.
17. Id. at *10.
18. Id. at *11-14.
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comply with the company's expense policy.' 9 The court, however, did not
believe there was sufficient evidence of this.20 In the end, Eisner con-
cluded that his only alternative was to terminate Ovitz in a non-fault
manner, thus triggering his extremely generous severance package. 21
Again, no one sat down to a full board meeting and no outside consulta-
tion occurred before making the decision.22
The plaintiff-stockholders brought this suit in the Court of Chancery of
Delaware. 23 After surviving the defendants' motions for summary judg-
ment, the plaintiffs were left with the burden of proving that the directors
did one of the following things: breached their fiduciary duties, acted in
bad faith, or exercised unadvised judgment when they hired and subse-
quently fired Ovitz. 24
The Delaware court ultimately held that the defendants did not breach
their fiduciary duties or commit waste. In so deciding, the court employed
a standard of gross negligence to determine whether a breach of the duty
of care occurred 25 and measured good faith against "the concept of inten-
tional dereliction of duty" and "conscious disregard for one's responsibili-
ties."'26 Under these standards, the court reasoned the defendants "were
at most ordinarily negligent" and, therefore, did not breach their fiduci-
ary duty of care.27 Further, through the use of a subjective standard, the
court found that the directors acted in good faith.28 The court determined
that the duty of loyalty was only at issue in analyzing Ovitz's behavior
surrounding his termination. 29 On this issue, however, the court found
that because Ovitz did not play a part in the decision to terminate himself
without cause, he did not breach his fiduciary duty of loyalty.30
The court reasoned that, in order for the plaintiffs to prevail on all
claims, they must rebut the presumption imposed by the business judg-
ment rule-that decisions of the board are informed, in good faith, and
made in the best interest of the company.31 Alternatively, the plaintiff
must show that the challenged transaction constituted waste,32 meaning
19. See id. at *16.
20. Id. at *14-16.
21. Id. at *20. Regarding the decision to fire Ovitz, the court came to the correct con-
clusion that according to the bylaws, the board did not have a duty to act, therefore they
did not breach their fiduciary duties or act in bad faith by failing to take action. The court
found that Eisner exercised proper business judgment in determining that a non-fault ter-
mination was his only option. Id. at *51. The severance package's value was estimated to
be worth between $70 and 140 million. Id. at *25.
22. Id. at *18, 20.
23. Id. at *1.
24. Id. at *36.
25. Id. at *32.
26. Id. at *36.
27. Id. at *39.
28. Id. at *41-43, 46-47.
29. Id. at *31.
30. Id. at *37.
31. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993); Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
32. The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Lit'g, 2005 WL 2056651, at *31.
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no reasonable business person could find that the corporation received
adequate compensation for the transaction. 33 In order to rebut the pre-
sumption imposed by the business judgment rule, the plaintiffs must show
that the defendant directors breached their fiduciary duties of due care or
loyalty. 34 If plaintiffs proved that the directors committed waste, this
would equate to an act of bad faith on their part.35
To determine whether the Disney directors violated their fiduciary duty
of care, the court relied on the Supreme Court of Delaware's summary
statement in Brehm v. Eisner that directors must consider all material
information that is reasonably available when making a business deci-
sion.36 To determine whether there was a violation when the directors
failed to act, the court used the standard set forth by In re Caremark
International Inc. Derivative Litigation,37 in which the court held that the
board's consistent and continuous failure to engage in oversight will con-
dition liability.38 For purposes of good faith, the court stated that direc-
tors must act with "honesty of purpose and in the best interests and
welfare of the corporation," 39 basing this conclusion on examples of bad
faith given in Gagliardi v. Trifoods International, Inc.40
Applying these standards to the facts of this case, the court reached the
conclusion that the defendants had not breached their fiduciary duties to
the shareholders of the corporation. Concerning the issue of waste, sur-
rounding the firing of Ovitz, which triggered his non-fault severance
package, the court found that there was no way that the company could
have avoided this result, because there were no grounds for a fault-based
termination and the company was better off without Ovitz. 41 As to the
decision by the board to hire Ovitz in the first place, despite the lack of
board meetings to discuss the issue, Eisner's failure to inform the board
of the negotiations until they were essentially complete, and the failure to
provide the compensation committee with a draft of the proposed em-
ployment agreement; the court found that the directors satisfied the stan-
dard required of them-to consider all material information that is
reasonably available in making their decision. 42 The court repeatedly em-
phasized that the standard in making these determinations is gross negli-
gence and that, while the actions of the board fell far short of what
shareholders should expect of their fiduciaries, the actions did not rise to
the level required for gross negligence. 43
33. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000).
34. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361.
35. The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Lit'g, 2005 WL 2056651 at *32.
36. 746 A.2d at 259.
37. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. 1996).
38. Id. at 971.
39. The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Lit'g, 2005 WL 2056651, at *36.
40. 683 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1996).
41. The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Lit'g, 2005 WL 2056651, at *39.
42. Id. at *39-47.
43. See id. at *41.
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The standards employed by the court for establishing a breach of the
fiduciary duty of care, while certainly based on precedent, present a con-
tradiction in terms that has persisted in duty of care jurisprudence. The
court first cites Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. for the pro-
position that due care requires a fiduciary to act with the "amount of care
which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar circum-
stances."' 44 This standard appears to be an ordinary negligence standard
of liability. The court then relies on seemingly contradicting precedent
that actions taken by directors must be grossly negligent in order to give
rise to an actionable claim. 45 Ultimately, the court adopted a gross negli-
gence standard for determining liability.46 Unfortunately, the apparent
consequence of adopting this standard is to allow a director to escape
liability despite a failure to act as a reasonably prudent man. In this case,
the Chancery Court should have followed the line of cases which have
held that ordinary negligence is the standard for determining liability
when the claim alleged is director neglect, or inaction, 47 as was the case
with the board in Disney, with the exception of Eisner and Russell. That
line of case law reasoned, correctly, that the gross negligence standard
was the proper corollary to the business judgment rule. In cases of direc-
tor inaction, however, where the business judgment rule is inapplicable,
the court held that the standard should be one of ordinary negligence, as
the deference given to directors performing their duties to the best of
their abilities should be greater than the deference awarded to a director
who has completely abandoned his responsibility. 48 This rationale prop-
erly advances the policies underlying the business judgment rule, and the
decision is in line with the decision in Allis-Chalmers.49 The court con-
cedes that the actions of the board were negligent with respect to their
duties surrounding the decision to hire Michael Ovitz; therefore, those
directors who were accused of inaction should be held liable under the
ordinary negligence standard.
Concerning Eisner's liability, the court improperly declined to consider
the unilateral process Eisner employed in deciding to hire Ovitz, estab-
lishing the terms of his employment agreement and compensation pack-
age, and determining whether he complied with his fiduciary duty of care.
Being the "mastermind" behind these decisions, Eisner should properly
enjoy the benefit of the business judgment rule. Despite this benefit, one
could argue that Eisner's behavior rose to a level which constitutes a
breach of his fiduciary duties. The court states that he "failed to keep the
board as informed as he should have," "stretched the outer boundaries of
his authority as CEO by acting without specific board direction or in-
44. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
45. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259 (Del. 2000).
46. The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Lit'g, 2005 WL 2056651, at *32.
47. See, e.g., Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 1987 WL 28436, at *1, *3 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 17, 1987).
48. Id. at *3.
49. Graham, 188 A.2d at 130.
2006]
SMU LAW REVIEW
volvement," and "issued a press release that placed significant pressure
on the board to accept Ovitz and approve the compensation package. '50
However, the court finds that this is irrelevant for determining whether
Eisner failed to inform himself of all material information that was rea-
sonably available, so as to breach his fiduciary duty.5 1 The fact that Eis-
ner never involved the board during the negotiation or decision-making
process should be considered evidence that he failed to inform himself of
all material information that was reasonably available. Given that the
purpose of board meetings is to foster the exchange of various viewpoints
and ideas, there should be a presumption that material information could
result from conducting such a meeting, especially because certain officers
were opposed to hiring Ovitz from the beginning. Consequently, a board
meeting should have been held to allow discussion of the reasons for their
discontent with the decision. Eisner's failure to involve the board, there-
fore, should be a source of potential liability because it deprived him of
what could have been material information surrounding the hiring
decision.
Two members of the compensation committee, Sidney Poitier and
Ignacio Lozano, were extremely uninvolved in the process of approving
Ovitz's employment agreement, and clear grounds existed to hold them
liable for their inaction.52 The extent of their involvement with the hiring
process consisted of one phone conversation each, during which terms
were discussed for the proposed agreement. 53 Their next involvement
came when it was time to approve the agreement in a committee meeting
(which lasted less than one hour). At the meeting they approved the
agreement based on their examination of a summary term sheet, without
ever reviewing the actual agreement, the correspondence which criticized
the terms of the agreement, or any of the financial calculations concern-
ing the value of the agreement. 54 The court held, however, that these men
were informed of all material information, and as a result, did not breach
their fiduciary duties. 55 This is an arguable conclusion. One could easily
imagine that had they considered the financial analysis that revealed the
true value of the employment agreement and then considered an ana-
lyst's views on the implications of that compensation level, they might
have made a different decision about the agreement and its terms.
By allowing this case to proceed to trial, the court seemed to imply that
it would take a harder look at the actions of directors and possibly hold
them to a stricter standard in evaluating their behavior. This assumption
proved to be incorrect, as the court relied on the self-serving testimony of
the very directors who had come under fire and interpreted those facts
and testimony in such a way as to preclude liability at all costs. The argu-
50. The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Lit'g, 2005 WL 2056651, at *43.
51. Id. at *41.
52. See id. at *43.
53. Id. at *44.
54. Id.
55. Id. at *46.
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ment for an ordinary negligence standard for directors who have ne-
glected their responsibilities is a strong one, and the court should have
considered that line of authority. Further, because the business judgment
rule emphasizes the process over the substance of business decisions, it
would not be difficult to conclude that Eisner's unilateral actions were
inappropriate and constituted a breach of his fiduciary duty. Directors
should be required to dedicate a certain amount of time and energy to
their position in deciding what would be in the best interest of the share-
holders. Imposing a greater risk of liability on directors of companies
would not deter qualified individuals from serving in that capacity, as the
courts fear, but would deter unqualified individuals from serving in that
capacity. Given the facts of this case, combined with the decision the
court reached, one can conclude that the duty of care is nothing more
than a farce, and that directors are free to completely ignore their respon-
sibilities to the company while still escaping liability.
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